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JUDICIAL REFORM: CONFLICTING AIMS AND 
IMPERFECT MODELS 
JOHN O. HALEY* 
INTRODUCTION 
Efforts to reform judicial systems around the world have continued 
with unabated vigor for at least four decades. In the United States and in 
Europe such efforts produced an array of reforms commencing in the 
1960s and lasting at least through the 1970s. Beginning with California in 
1960, for example, by 1979 every U.S. state but one had created one or 
more judicial commissions to set standards and deal with complaints of 
misconduct against individual state judges.1 Although the United States 
Congress eschewed the state approach of establishing commissions for 
such purpose, in 1980, the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act gave the 
chief judge for each circuit responsibility for disciplinary oversight of all 
federal judges within the circuit in conjunction with a special committee 
comprising of the chief judge and an equal number of circuit and district 
judges.2  
By the end of the 1980s the attention of the judicial reform movement 
had shifted to Latin America, and subsequently, after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union to Eastern Europe, then to Central, South and Southeast 
Asia, and most recently to the Middle East.3 Two factors contributed to 
this change of focus. The first was acute concern over the need to prevent 
future failures of judicial independence under repressive authoritarian 
regimes,4 particularly any repetition of the experiences of Argentina and 
 * Wiley B. Rutledge Professor of Law and Director of the Whitney R. Harris Institute for 
Global Legal Studies, Washington University School of Law. A.B. (1964), Princeton University; 
LL.B. (1969), Yale University; LL.M. (1971), University of Washington. 
 1. Arkansas adopted its Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission by constitutional 
amendment in 1988. ARK. CONST. amend. 66, available at http://www.state.ar.us/jddc/pdf/ 
amendment_66.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2005). For detailed information on state oversight 
commissions, see American Judicature Society, State Judicial Conduct Organizations webpage, at 
http://www.ajs.org/ethics/eth_conduct-orgs.asp (last visited Oct. 15, 2005). 
 2. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (2000). The Judicial Improvements Act of 2002 (28 U.S.C. §§ 351–364) 
replaced the 1980 Judicial Conduct and Disability Act but did not substantially alter the procedures for 
judicial oversight under the prior legislation. American Judicature Society, Federal Judicial Conduct 
webpage, at http://www.ajs.org/ethics/eth_fed-jud-conduct.asp (last visited Oct. 14, 2005). 
 3. Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, 77 FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 1998, at 95. 
 4. Id. at 100–01. 
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Chile in the late 1970s and early 1980s.5 A second catalyst was new 
interest in the effectiveness of judicial systems by political economists, 
especially those influenced by Douglass North and other “new 
institutionalist” economists.6 
The result of this attention shift has been an explosion of development 
programs for judicial reform.7 By the turn of the century, the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) alone had spent hundreds 
of millions of dollars on such efforts.8 USAID’s Office of Democracy and 
Governance, for example, currently allocates over 1.5 million dollars a 
year to its Rule of Law Program.9 The European Union,10 Canada,11 the 
Nordic states,12 and Japan13 are especially active in developing and 
funding significant reform programs, particularly in their respective 
regions.14 At the global and regional levels, the World Bank and the Inter-
 5. See, e.g., Alejandro M. Garro, The Role of the Argentine Judiciary in Controlling 
Governmental Action Under a State of Siege, 4 HUM. RTS. L.J. 311, 314–16 (1983); Margaret Popkin, 
Efforts to Enhance Judicial Independence in Latin America: A Comparative Perspective, in GUIDANCE 
FOR PROMOTING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY 112–216 (Nov. 2001), available at 
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/pnacm007.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2005). 
 6. See, e.g., DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE (1990); EIRIK G. FURUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC 
THEORY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (1997). 
 7. For a broad but brief overview of judicial reform and other “rule of law” efforts over the past 
two decades, see Carothers, supra note 3, at 95. 
 8. Id. at 103–04. 
 9. See USAID, BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, 
OFFICE OF DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE DATA SHEET 23, http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/ 
cbj2004/cent_prog/dcha.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2005). 
 10. The European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, funded by the EU, spends around 
100 million a year on efforts to strengthen the rule of law. EUROPEAN COMM’N, A WORLD PLAYER: 
THE EUROPEAN UNION’S EXTERNAL RELATIONS 9 (2004), at http://europa.eu.int/comm/publications/ 
booklets/move/47/en.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2005). 
 11. Canadian development assistance policy also emphasizes rule of law initiatives. CANADIAN 
INT’L DEV. AGENCY, GOVERNMENT OF CANADA POLICY FOR CIDA ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 
DEMOCRATIZATION AND GOOD GOVERNANCE 5, http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/ 
vLUImages/HRDG2/$file/HRDG-Policy-nophoto-e.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2006). 
 12. See, e.g., SWEDISH INT’L DEV. COOPERATION AGENCY, DEPARTMENT FOR DEMOCRACY AND 
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, JUSTICE AND PEACE: SIDA’S PROGRAMME FOR PEACE, DEMOCRACY AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS (1997), http://www.sida.se/shared/jsp/download.jsp?f=Part+1+JusticePeace97. 
pdf&a=2085 (last visited Jan. 15, 2006). 
 13. For example, the Japanese Legal Assistance Project of the International Cooperation 
Department (ICD) of the Research and Training Institute of Japan’s Ministry of Justice has provided 
much effort and resources to aiding development of basic laws in other Asian countries, including 
helping draft Cambodia’s civil code. See TAKESHITA MORIO, SIGNIFICANCE OF PROVIDING SUPPORT 
FOR THE DRAFTING OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA AND 
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE DRAFT CODE, http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/RATI/ICD/icd-
09.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2005). 
 14. Carothers, supra note 3, at 103. 
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American Development Bank,15 respectively, play leading roles as 
institutional sponsors of judicial reform efforts. Other notable well-funded 
efforts include projects by the Central European and Eurasian Law 
Initiative (CEELI) of the American Bar Association;16 the Democracy and 
Rule of Law Project of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace;17 
the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE);18 and the 
Center for International Legal Cooperation (CILC), a Dutch non-profit 
organization.19 The list goes on and on.  
Assessment of the results of these myriad judicial reform efforts 
remains mixed. As illustrated by the views expressed by Judge Peter 
Messitte and Linn Hammergren in the preceding issue of the Washington 
University Global Studies Law Review,20 a few observers see meaningful 
gains while others remain considerably more pessimistic.21 My purpose in 
this Article is not to attempt to resolve such contrasting views or even to 
suggest how best to proceed in assessing judicial reforms overall or in 
particular regions or countries. Rather, my aim here is more modest. I wish 
simply to attempt to identify a few underlying problems that appear to 
inhibit effective reforms from achieving broadly shared goals. In so doing, 
I suggest a research agenda designed to develop feasible solutions. We 
need to analyze more thoroughly the institutional contexts and models 
from which reform efforts tend to draw. Such an exercise would enable us 
to identify and suggest the particular features of judicial systems that 
deserve renewed attention as appropriate for emulation. Both my data and 
my analysis grow out of a continuing study of judicial systems begun 
 15. See Inter-American Development Bank, Sustainable Development Department, Rule of Law, 
http://www.iadb.org/sds/scs/site_2776_e.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2006). 
 16. See A.B.A., Center for Eastern European and Eurasion Law Initiative, http://www.abanet. 
org/ceeli/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2005). 
 17. See Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace, Democracy and Rule of Law, Homepage, 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/programs/global/index.cfm?fa=proj&id=101 (last visited Oct. 5, 
2005). 
 18. See Org. for Security and Cooperation in Eur., Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights webpage, http://www.osce.org/odihr/?page=overview (last visited Oct. 5, 2005). 
 19. See Ctr. for Int’l Legal Cooperation, General Information webpage, http://www.cilc.nl/gen 
info.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2005). 
 20. See, e.g., Judge Peter Messitte, Expanding the Rule of Law: Judicial Reform in Central 
Europe & Latin America, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 617 (2005); Linn Hammergren, 
Expanding the Rule of Law: Judicial Reform in Latin America, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 
601 (2005). 
 21. See, e.g., Hiram E. Chodosh, Emergence from the Dilemmas of Justice Reform, 38 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 587 (2003); Bryant G. Garth, Building Strong and Independent Judiciaries through the New 
Law Development: Behind the Paradox of Consensus Programs and Perpetually Disappointing 
Results, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 383 (2002). 
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several years ago.22 At this point, I should hasten to add, my conclusions 
remain tentative. 
I. DATA AND CONTEXT: VITAL INDICATORS FOR JUDICIAL REFORM 
Policy aims determine policy choices. Goals differ, however, for 
promoters of judicial reform. Different agencies have quite different aims. 
Thomas Carothers, co-director of the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace Democracy and Rule of Law Project, identifies four 
“clusters” of concern with respect to judicial reform programs in Latin 
America in particular. They include promotion of viable democratic 
institutions and processes, economic development, human rights and 
social justice, and effective international criminal law enforcement, 
particularly drug trafficking, money-laundering, and related transnational 
criminal activities.23 A significant number of reform initiatives are thus 
part and parcel of progressive political and social concerns to enhance 
effective human rights protection and generally to promote social justice.24 
Others reflect a market-oriented, economic reform agenda, with emphasis 
on measures to foster predictable and stable enforcement of contract and 
property rights.25 Another set combines elements of both with an emphasis 
on everyday citizen access to justice through a more efficient and effective 
judiciary.26  
Values also matter. Nearly all U.S.–sponsored reform projects are 
couched rhetorically in terms of the “rule of law” as a means to foster 
democratic governance by establishing institutional constraints against 
 22. The project began with a comparative law seminar on judicial organization and independence 
at the University of Washington School of Law in the spring of 2000. 
 23. Thomas Carothers, Many Agendas of Rule of Law Reform in Latin America, in RULE OF LAW 
IN LATIN AMERICA: THE INTERNATIONAL PROMOTION OF JUDICIAL REFORM 4, 6–12 (PILAR DOMINGO 
& RACHEL SIEDER EDS., 2001). 
 24. See, e.g., Shannan C. Krasnokutski, Human Rights in Transition: The Success and Failure of 
Polish and Russian Criminal Justice Reform, 33 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 13 (2001); César Landa, 
The Scales of Justice in Peru: Judicial Reform and Fundamental Rights, in UNIVERSITY OF LONDON 
INSTITUTE OF LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES, OCCASIONAL PAPERS # 24 (2001), http://www.sas.ac.uk/ 
ilas/Landa.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2005); Popkin, supra note 5. 
 25. See, e.g., Hugo Eyzaguirre, INTER AM. DEV. BANK, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT: JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA, http://www.iadb.org/sds/doc/sgc-Doc12-E.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 7, 2005); Gary Goodpaster, Law Reform in Developing Countries, 13 TRANSNAT’L L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 659 (2003); Richard Kossick, The Rule of Law and Development in Mexico, 21 
ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 715 (2004). 
 26. See, e.g., MARIA DAKOLIAS, WORLD BANK, THE JUDICIAL SECTOR IN LATIN AMERICA AND 
THE CARIBBEAN: ELEMENTS OF REFORM (1996), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContent 
Server/WDSP/IB/1996/06/01/000009265_3961214163938/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 7, 2005). 
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arbitrary authoritarian executive rule. Yet, as specific reform measures are 
introduced, fundamental disagreements begin to surface. The differences 
in means and approach, and the attendant conflicts that emerge, reflect 
their proponents’ perceptions of the threat of authoritarian rule by “right-
wing” versus “left-wing” despots. Similarly, while judicial independence 
is a frequently stated goal, views necessarily differ with respect to the 
advisability of reforms intended to insulate individual judges from any 
external control or accountability. As expressed by Linn Hammergren, “an 
absolutely independent judiciary, which answers only to itself (no 
accountability) is as much a problem as one that is absolutely 
dependent.”27 Procedural reforms designed to promote efficiency, fairness, 
and accuracy also often reflect an ideological divide. Those who seek to 
prevent use of the criminal process by repressive “rightist” regimes and to 
ensure greater efficiency of, and more access to the civil process for the 
politically, economically, and socially disadvantaged will generally favor 
very different reform measures from those who seek more effective 
criminal law enforcement for transnational crimes or who emphasize 
greater protection of contract and property rights, with greater certainty 
and predictability in litigated outcomes.  
Whatever the potential for disagreement over some reform goals and 
measures, three fundamental aims seem to have garnered broad consensus. 
Nearly all groups ostensibly support efforts to increase judicial 
competence, to reduce corruption, and to improve case management and 
judicial administration.28 All of these goals relate to public trust in the 
courts and appear at first glance to be relatively free from the tensions of 
opposing ideological concerns. Structural reforms to increase judicial 
competence and to reduce political influence in the selection of judges are 
thus widely supported. Similarly, nearly all reform agencies at least pay lip 
service to efforts to reduce corruption and to improve judicial 
administration, especially caseload management.  
Goals and values, however, do not determine the appropriateness of 
specific reforms. Data and context count as well. Reform programs 
 27. LINN HAMMERGREN, FIFTEEN YEARS OF JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA: WHERE WE 
ARE AND WHY WE HAVEN’T MADE MORE PROGRESS 19, available at http://www.pogar.org/ 
publications/judiciary/linn2/latin.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2005) [hereinafter “HAMMERGREN, FIFTEEN 
YEARS”]. 
 28. See, e.g., Joseph R. Thome, Heading South But Looking North: Globalization and Law 
Reform in Latin America, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 691. Thome principally focuses on the programs initiated 
and supported by the World Bank. He notes the gradual re-definition of World Bank aims from a 
preoccupation with developmental concerns to a “more nuanced” approach linking development and 
human rights. Id. at 698. 
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inevitably are based on information and understandings about those 
judicial systems that do work and some underlying rationales for their 
success, yet determining actual causality is almost impossible. No one can 
be sure, for example, whether the introduction of some new mechanism 
for selecting or training judges, or for improved court administration, will 
have the desired outcome without reliable data on prior experiences with 
similar mechanisms in similar contexts. Yet, we lack the most relevant 
data on existing systems and the means for evaluating the likely effects of 
their emulation. Consequently, one problem with nearly all reform 
programs is that little effort is made to evaluate the full range of available 
models with any careful, comparative assessment of their effectiveness in 
particular institutional and cultural contexts. 
Consider, for example, structural reforms to reduce political influence 
in the judicial appointment process. One much-touted reform in Latin 
America has been the introduction of special councils to select the 
nominees for judicial appointment to the executive.29 The goal has been to 
make political considerations less significant in the appointment of judges 
under presidential systems based predominately on a U.S. model where 
presidents nominate all federal judges subject to confirmation by only the 
legislative branch. Those who have proposed the introduction of such 
“judicial councils” apparently paid scant attention to the context in which 
the model councils were created and have been used elsewhere.30 
The French were the first to create a judicial council, the Conseil 
superior de la magistrature, for selection of judges and administration of 
the judiciary in the 1946 Constitution for the Fourth Republic.31 Italy 
authorized a Consiglio Superiuore della Magistratura (CSM) in its 1948 
Constitution,32 although the Christian Democrats failed to implement these 
provisions until 1958 when previous election losses finally forced the 
government to concede pressures for greater political oversight and 
accountability in the administration of the judiciary.33 An intended result 
 29. For a detailed examination and critical evaluation of the use of judicial councils in Latin 
America, see Linn Hammergren, Do Judicial Councils Further Judicial Reform? Lessons from Latin 
America (Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace, Democracy and Rule of Law Project Rule of Law 
Series Working Paper No. 28, June 2002), http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/wp28.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 
2005) [hereinafter “Hammergren, Judicial Reform”]. 
 30. Id. at 3. 
 31. See Jean Gicquel, L’evolution du Conseil supérieur de la magistrature, in THIERRY S. 
RENOUS, ED., LES CONSEILS SUPÉRIEURS DE LA MAGISTRATURE EN EUROPE 202. 
 32. See Carlo Guarnieri & Pedro C. Magahães, Democratic Consolidation, Judicial Reform, and 
the Judicialization of Politics in Southern Europe, (Instituto de Ciêcias Sociais de Universidade de 
Lisboa, Working Paper, Apr. 2001). 
 33. FREDERIC SPOTTS & THEODOR WEISER, ITALY: A DIFFICULT DEMOCRACY 151 (1986). 
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was to lessen the control of senior judges over the selection and promotion 
of younger judges. Ideological splits within the magistry and additional 
reforms in the 1960s further reduced the influence of conservative senior 
judges and reportedly lead to politicization of the judiciary and attendant 
corruption.34 
The experience of Spain and Portugal differs as judicial councils were 
introduced and used effectively to buttress (conservative) judicial 
autonomy.35 As Linn Hammergren has observed,36 the Latin American 
experience with judicial councils reflects similar concerns but with more 
mixed results. There, judicial councils were introduced to reduce partisan 
political considerations in the selection of judges and judicial 
administration, but thus far do not appear to have been successful.  
The quest for appropriate reforms should begin with a better sense of 
which are most apt to produce the desired effects.37 For example, how are 
different ways of selecting and training judges more or less likely to 
improve competence on the bench? What institutional and cultural factors 
appear best to explain differences in the degree of judicial integrity—or 
incidences of corruption—across systems? And which court systems seem 
to be the best managed and why? In other words, what is needed at the 
outset of any reform effort is a basic inventory of the principal patterns of 
judicial organization, as well as a preliminary assessment of what works 
and why. 
II. THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL FACTORS ON JUDICIAL 
INTEGRITY 
The inquiry might best begin with a look at what evidence we have of 
current systems that seem to be either particularly successful or mired in 
failure. To bridge the gap between conflicting goals, more attention needs 
to be paid to the inter-relationships among social trust, wealth distribution, 
and corruption. Judicial reform is only a small piece of the puzzle. Neither 
human rights nor developmental goals can be achieved without effectively 
 34. Id. at 158–61; Donatella Della Porta, A Judges’ Revolution? Political Corruption and the 
Judiciary in Italy, 39 EUR. J. POL. RES. 4, 4–5 (2001). Della Porta notes that in the 1980s and 1990s 
the problems of political interference and judicial corruption began to recede as the judiciary became 
increasingly autonomous as an institution. Id. 
 35. Guarnieri & Magahães, supra note 32, at 27–29. 
 36. Hammergren, Judicial Reform, supra note 29, at 5, 18. 
 37. Of the few studies available, few even attempt such comparison. See, e.g., Edgardo 
Buscaglia, Judicial Corruption in Developing Countries: Its Causes and Economic Consequences 
(July 1999), available at http://www-hoover.stanford.edu/publications/epp/95/95b.html (last visited 
Oct. 7, 2005). 
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breaking and then reversing a spiral of social distrust, wealth inequality, 
and corruption.38 
Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perception Index (TI 
CPI)39 provides a useful gauge of which counties seem to be the most 
successful in preventing official corruption. The most recent survey (2004) 
lists the following countries as the twenty-five least corrupt in order of 
rank: Finland, New Zealand, Denmark, Iceland, Singapore, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Norway, Australia, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, 
Canada, Austria, Luxembourg, Germany, Hong Kong, Belgium, Ireland, 
United States of America, Chile, Barbados, France, Spain, Japan, and 
Malta.40 The index does not measure judicial corruption in particular, but 
does provide at least a rough estimate of predictable levels of official 
corruption generally.41 Noteworthy is the apparent correspondence of high 
per capita income, literacy, wealth equality, and levels of trust with lack of 
corruption. To some this may suggest an intractable problem: Unless the 
social spirals of relative poverty, illiteracy, chronic inequalities in wealth, 
and, above all, social distrust can somehow be corrected, corruption and 
other dysfunctions in judicial and other public institutions are likely to 
persist. 
As the recent study by Paul J. Zak and Stephen Knack entitled “Trust 
and Growth” demonstrates, significantly higher rates of economic growth 
prevail in environments where social trust is high, and low-trust societies 
reduce growth.42 They conclude that very low-trust societies can be caught 
in a poverty trap.43 Their findings are further buttressed by more specific 
 38. See, e.g., Luz Estrella Nagle, The Cinderella of Government: Judicial Reform in Latin 
America, 30 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 345 (2000) (one of the most telling critiques of judicial reform in 
Latin America by a former Colombian judge, which insists in locating reforms of the judiciary within a 
broader agenda of political, social, and economic reform). 
 39. TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION 
PERCEPTION INDEX 2004, http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2004/dnld/media_pack_en.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 10, 2005) [hereinafter “TI CPI”]. 
 40. Id. 
 41. As a measure of judicial corruption the TI CPI has to be used with extreme care. Japan, for 
example, ranks 24th in the TI CPI but has experienced not even a single incident of judicial corruption 
in a half century. See John O. Haley, The Japanese Judiciary: Maintaining Integrity, Autonomy and 
the Public Trust, in LAW IN JAPAN: AT THE TURNING POINT (D.F. Foote ed., forthcoming 2007) 
(manuscript on file with author). 
 42. Paul J. Zak & Stephen Knack, Trust and Growth, 111 (470) ECON. J. 295, 296 (Apr. 2001). 
For a positive evaluation of the “robustness” of the Zak and Knack paper, see Sjoerd Beugelsdijk, 
Henri L.F. de Groot, & Anton B.T.M. van Schaik, Trust and Economic Growth: A Robustness 
Analysis, 56 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 118–34 (2004). 
 43. Zak & Knack, supra note 42, at 296. The poverty trap is that if trust is too low in a society, 
people will be disinclined to save money, and savings overall will be insufficient to sustain positive 
economic output growth. Id. 
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data on judicial corruption. In a 1999 report, the Geneva-based Centre for 
the Independence of Judges and Lawyers identified “pervasive” corruption 
in thirty of forty-eight countries surveyed, nearly all developing or 
transitional states.44 
Still, broad indices of wealth, equality and trust do not fully explain 
why Chile (TI CPI #20) appears to be so much more successful than 
Argentina (TI CPI #108) or Ghana (TI CPI #64) in comparison to Cote 
d’Ivoire (TI CPI #133) or even Barbados (TI CPI #21), Botswana (TI CPI 
#31), and Bahrain (TI CPI #34) as compared to the Dominican Republic 
(TI CPI #87), Malawi (TI CPI #90), and Saudi Arabia (TI CPI #71). 
However reliable the TI CPI and other measures may or may not be 
with respect to official corruption in general, they are not necessarily 
accurate with respect to judicial corruption. Hence, such indices must be 
used with caution. The causes for judicial corruption appear to vary from 
state to state.45 The Japanese experience illustrates differences within 
countries in the nature and locale of corruption. Corruption has long been 
endemic within the partisan (or perhaps more aptly, factionalized) political 
arena.46 Yet public officials generally have a record of integrity as well as 
competence. With respect to the courts, no country in the world can fairly 
boast of a more honest or competent corps of judges, prosecutors, and 
staff. The only case in the past half century in which a judge was removed 
for improper conduct involving financial favors was that of a judge who 
had accepted the invitation to play golf at the expense of a lawyer who, a 
few weeks later, was appointed trustee in a bankruptcy action.47 With this 
caveat, we can nevertheless reasonably assume some correspondence 
between the levels of perceived official corruption in general and within 
the judicial system in particular.  
Differences in the incidence of corruption also surely depend on an 
identifiable set of specific factors. Few are likely to take issue with the 
assumption that corruption will be less prevalent among countries in 
which: (1) the norms of official and judicial integrity are well established 
and internalized by those involved; (2) deviations from these norms are 
 44. Centre for the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Ninth Annual Report on Attacks on 
Justice, cited in UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR DRUG CONTROL AND CRIME PREVENTION, GLOBAL 
PROGRAMME AGAINST CORRUPTION, STRENGTHENING JUDICIAL INTEGRITY AGAINST CORRUPTION, 
CICP-10, Mar. 2001, at 4. 
 45. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR DRUG CONTROL AND CRIME PREVENTION, GLOBAL 
PROGRAMME AGAINST CORRUPTION, STRENGTHENING JUDICIAL INTEGRITY AGAINST CORRUPTION, 
CICP-10, Mar. 2001, at 6. 
 46. RICHARD H. MITCHELL, POLITICAL BRIBERY IN JAPAN xv–xvi (1996). 
 47. Haley, supra note 41, at text to n.23. 
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relatively easy to detect; and (3) potential offenders reasonably anticipate 
the prompt imposition of informal or formal sanctions. Thus to some 
extent, we may also reasonably assume that related institutional 
configurations—both judicial and political—play some contributive part. 
On these assumptions we should then attempt to discern what, if any, 
basic differences exist in judicial organization, especially in the selection, 
training, and monitoring of judges, and how these patterns might arguably 
affect judicial integrity and competence. We particularly need to identify 
within different legal systems those features that reinforce the 
internalization of norms of integrity among judges and that facilitate both 
detection and prompt punishment of wrongdoing. The inquiry could well 
begin with a preliminary examination of the shared features of common 
law and civil law systems. 
III. COMMON LAW SYSTEMS AND CIVIL LAW SYSTEMS 
A. Common Law Systems 
Common law jurisdictions share two basic features. Both of which 
relate directly to the integrity and competence of the judiciary in general. 
First, especially at the trial court level, judges are usually selected from a 
pool of practicing lawyers. Second, they generally serve in the court to 
which they were first appointed for the duration of their careers, with no 
expectation of moving to a higher court as a normal career progression. 
Most common law jurisdictions follow the English pattern. Judges for 
courts at all levels generally will have spent a significant number of years 
in practice almost exclusively as barristers. The particulars of the selection 
process vary by country, but sitting judges and members of an elite legal 
bureaucracy usually make the actual (if not the formal) decisions regarding 
judicial appointments. Past patterns have resulted in judiciaries largely 
determined by judges who themselves were members of an elite pool of 
barristers (generally identified as Queen’s Counsel) and whose integrity, 
general legal competence, partisan political neutrality, and individual 
autonomy as judges appear largely to be taken for granted. 
Yet, common experience and the elite nature of the English-styled 
judiciary in turn strengthen the effectiveness of peer pressures (social 
disapproval) as a mechanism to control individual judicial behavior. In 
most common law systems judges enjoy high professional and social 
prestige. Each judge thus possesses a certain “social capital” that is 
endangered to some extent by misconduct by any of his/her peers. 
Consequently, judges can be expected to express strong disapproval, even 
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extreme censure, of any judge believed guilty of serious moral infraction. 
The principle of the autonomy of the individual judge, as well as generally 
accepted notions of judicial independence, allows significant room for 
maverick behavior. However, the informal constraints of the English 
system—particularly the potential for peer disapproval—limit deviation 
from accepted norms of behavior. The system thus presumptively 
produces fewer maverick judges. 
The process for appointment of judges in England and Wales is 
undergoing a transformation. Recent legislation eliminated the office of 
the Lord Chancellor, which until now, made appointments with the advice 
of a Legal and Judicial Services Group.48 Whether the new legislation will 
result in a significant shift in who influences the process is not yet clear. 
The United States is the common law aberration. Although the United 
States shares the two fundamental features of all common law systems (the 
selection of judges by appointment or election) from a pool of experienced 
lawyers to a single court for the expected duration of a judicial career; and 
the necessity for significant qualifications. First, as judicial selection in the 
United States occurs either through the electoral process or by political 
appointment, political accountability is assured but partisan politics 
necessarily permeates the selection and above all retention processes. Non-
partisan elections, politically-neutral commissions to make initial 
recommendations (such as the “Missouri Plan”), and other attempts to 
insulate potential candidates from blatantly-partisan political appointment 
merely mask political influence. By nearly all accounts they fail 
significantly to weaken partisan considerations. 
Moreover, with the exception of federal judges and judges in Rhode 
Island, no judge in the United States enjoys lifetime tenure.49 In two states 
(Massachusetts and New Hampshire) judges are subject to mandatory 
retirement at age seventy.50 Judges in all other states and the District of 
Columbia have limited tenure and undergo some form of political scrutiny 
in order to remain in office beyond an initial term of years.51 Some states 
provide for longer initial terms of office for appellate judges, especially at 
the highest level, than for courts of first instance, but, with the three 
 48. U.K. DEP’T FOR GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS IN ENGLAND AND 
WALES: POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/judicial/appointments/ 
jappinfr.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2005). 
 49. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES: APPELLATE AND GENERAL 
JURISDICTION COURTS 12 (Jan. 2004), http://www.ajs.org/js/JudicialSelectionCharts.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 14, 2005). 
 50. Id. at 10, 11. 
 51. Id. 
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aforementioned exceptions, no state judge or justice remains in office for 
more than fifteen years without being subject to either a retention vote (a 
partisan or nonpartisan election in which they may be opposed by a 
competing candidate for the office) or reappointment (by governor with 
confirmation of one or both houses of the legislature or by a judicial 
commission) or both.52 The District of Columbia has the longest initial 
term of office (fifteen years)53 followed by New York (fourteen years for 
justices of the highest court and first-instance judges but, oddly, not 
intermediate appellate judges, whose initial term is only five years).54 
California (Supreme Court justices and Courts of Appeal judges), 
Delaware, Virginia (Supreme Court justices), and West Virginia (Supreme 
Court justices) have initial twelve-year terms.55 In twenty-three states the 
initial term of office is six years or less.56 The terms vary from seven to ten 
years for all judges in seven states.57 
On a more positive note, the United States also differs from its 
common law “cousins” in the variety of legal career experience judges 
bring to the bench at the time of their initial appointment. Over a third of 
all federal judges appointed between 1977 and 2002 had prior 
prosecutorial experience.58 The percentage of those with prior judicial 
experience is even greater. Nearly half of all U.S. district court judges and 
two thirds of circuit court judges appointed between 1977 and 2002 had 
prior judicial experience.59 Conversely, less than a third of federal judges 
appointed during the past three decades had no judicial or prosecutorial 
experience.60 In effect, as some suggest,61 at the federal level the United 
States is increasingly developing a career judiciary of sorts. Nevertheless, 
the pool of potential state and federal judges remains very large, limited in 
 52. See generally id. 
 53. Id. at 8. 
 54. Id. at 11. 
 55. Id. at 7, 8, 14. 
 56. Id. at 7–14 (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Vermont, 
Washington, Wyoming). 
 57. Id. (Connecticut, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania). 
 58. See Sheldon Goldman et al., W. Bush Remaking the Judiciary: Like Father Like Son?, 86 
JUDICATURE 283, 304 tbl.2 (2003). 
 59. Id. at 304 tbl.2, 308 tbl.4. 
 60. Id. 
 61. As demonstrated by annual statistics published by the ABA on legal education and bar 
admissions, entry into an ABA accredited law school is the principal restriction on the number of 
lawyers who enter the profession each year. See A.B.A., Legal Education and Bar Admission Statistics 
webpage, http://www.abanet.org/legaled/statistics/le_bastats.html. Graduation from an ABA-
accredited law school is today tantamount to admission to practice. 
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terms of number and competence only by access to legal education in the 
historically-unique system of post-undergraduate, professional schools.62 
Thus, in contrast to the English (and other common law jurisdictions), 
the variations among judges in the United States in terms of integrity, 
competence, and political partisanship are expectedly much greater. The 
degree of variation among judges in turn reduces the influence of peer 
pressures and enables an even greater degree of individual judicial 
autonomy. In other words, one is apt to find more maverick judges—in 
terms of integrity, partisan political rulings, and basic incompetence—in 
the United States than in any other common law jurisdiction.  
B. Civil Law Systems 
In contrast to common law systems, in most continental European and 
other civil law systems (excluding Latin America and other hybrid 
systems) judges are members of an elite corps of civil servants in one or 
more specialized “judicial service” bureaucracies.63 They are selected first 
through a highly selective system of secondary and post secondary 
education, and then through varied programs to provide advanced practical 
legal training through apprenticeship and examination programs (as in 
Belgium)64 or specialized institutes and training programs specifically 
designed for judges (as in Spain),65 judges and prosecutors (as in France)66 
or the legal profession in general (as in postwar Japan67 and Korea).68 
Examinations for entry into separate training programs as well as the 
programs themselves help to ensure that the pool of potential judges is 
 62. Goldman, supra note 58, at 305. 
 63. The judicial corps are organized as separate bureaucracies for administrative courts, other 
specialized courts, and the regular courts with civil and criminal jurisdiction. 
 64. European Judicial Training Network, Belgium: The High Council of Justice webpage, 
http://www.ejtn.net/www/en/html/nodes_main/4_1949_208/5_1585_3.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2005). 
 65. European Judicial Training Network, Spain: Escuela Judicial Consejo General del Poder 
Judicial, Centro de Estudios Jurídicos de la Administración de Justicia (CEJAJ) webpage, 
http://www.ejta.net/www/en/html/nodes_main/4_1949_208/5_1585_25.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 
2005). 
 66. European Judicial Training Network, France: The French National School for the Judiciary 
webpage, http://www.ejta.net/www/en/html/nodes_main/4_1949_208/5_1585_9.htm (last visited Oct. 
14, 2005); Daniel Ludat, The French System of Recruitment and Training of magistrat Judicial 
Officers, LEGAL CONNEXION, Dec. 15, 1994, http://www.legal-connexion.info/research/ENMIud.htm 
(last visited Oct. 14, 2005). 
 67. The Secretariat of the Judicial Reform Council, The Japanese Judicial System 4 (July 1999), 
available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/judiciary/0620system.html. 
 68. The Judicial Research Training Institute, Curriculum: Training of Prospective Judges 
Prosecutors and Lawyers, available at http://jrti.scourt.go.kr/english/curriculum_01.asp?flag=1 (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2005). 
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relatively small and competent. Unlike their counterparts in continental 
European legal systems, common law judges move from lower to higher 
courts in a career progression. Senior members of the specialized judicial 
corps or a broader cadre of elite legal bureaucrats determine a judge’s 
career advancement. They typically fill staff positions under a judicial 
council or within a ministry of justice or other agency responsible for 
judicial administration. 
The European patterns function generally to produce a relatively 
competent and honest judiciary. However, as career government officials, 
judges are not fully immune from any dysfunctions, and their effects, that 
may plague other civil bureaucracies. One would expect therefore that 
countries with significant levels of official corruption in general would 
also have significant levels of judicial corruption.  
In this respect Japan is a variant. As noted, Japan is a low-corruption 
state, yet it has long suffered disturbingly high levels of political 
corruption at the national and local levels.69 Nevertheless, no country in 
the world can claim a more honest and competent judiciary.70 Nor does 
any country have a more selective system for initial appointment based on 
merit as measured by educational achievement.71 The judiciary is small—
less than 3000 judges in a country of nearly 130 million. Senior judges 
closely manage it—and the judiciary is closely monitored by both senior 
and peer judges throughout a judge’s career.72 Because most trials and all 
appeals involve three-judge panels, judges rarely adjudicate by 
themselves.73 They are also transferred around the country on a periodic 
basis, spiraling through courts at all levels but into increasingly senior 
positions as their careers progress.74 Promotion rests on continuous 
performance evaluations over time by senior judges.75 
Few judicial systems thus satisfy as fully the various criteria for 
maintaining low levels of judicial corruption. Among the most advanced 
industrial states, Japan ranks between Denmark and Sweden in terms of 
equal distribution of wealth.76 Within the judiciary the internalization of 
 69. MITCHELL, supra note 46, at xiv–xvii (1996). 
 70. The Secretariat of the Judicial Reform Council, supra note 67, at 1–2. 
 71. Haley, supra note 41, at 5. 
 72. Id. at 3, 6. 
 73. Id. at 3. 
 74. Id. at 6. 
 75. Id. at 5–7. 
 76. The Gini index is a measure of income inequality that determines the extent to which the 
distribution of income (or consumption) among individuals or household in a country deviates from a 
perfectly equal distribution. For Japan, the Gini Index is 24.90 (1993) as compared to Denmark at 
24.70 (1997) and Sweden at 25 (1995). See United Nations Development Programme, Human 
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integrity as a overriding value and the means for detection of those who 
violate the norm are both very strong. Moreover, both formal and informal 
sanctions are readily available to punish any offender. 
If Japan represents the best, the Latin American model represents the 
worst. The most developed and wealthiest Latin American states share 
certain basic problems with the least developed and poorest states. No 
single region on the globe suffers greater disparities of wealth. Ecuador 
ranks best in terms of the most equitable distribution of wealth with a Gini 
index of 43.70. All of the seventeen other Latin American republics—
excluding Cuba and Belize—are among the forty countries with the 
greatest disparities of wealth based on the Gini index.77  
The Argentine judiciary is exemplary as a judiciary in crisis despite 
over a decade of major reform efforts.78 Fundamentally similar to other 
Latin American systems, Argentina combines the worst features of the 
American system with those of civil law systems. Judges at the national 
and in most provinces are appointed by the executive with consent of the 
upper house of the legislature with life tenure during good behavior. Since 
1994, judicial appointments to all federal courts except the Supreme Court 
must be made from a list of three candidates selected by the newly 
established a Council of the Magistry (Consejo de la magistrtura).79 At 
least two provinces—Buenos Aires and Cordoba—have also adopted a 
similar judicial council system. The appointments are not merely to courts 
at particular levels but to specialized chambers within the court at that 
level. 
Development Indicators 2003 webpage, available at http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/indicators. 
cfm?x=5&4=2C2=2 (last visited Oct. 14, 2005). 
 77. Id. Interestingly, the only East Asian state in this list is the Philippines, which shares 
institutional history with Latin America as first a Spanish colony subject to colonial Spanish American 
law and colonial rule (under Mexico) with subsequent American institutional and cultural influences as 
a U.S. colony thereafter. 
 78. Unless otherwise indicated the data and conclusions related to the Argentine judiciary are 
based on a series of interviews with lawyers, judges, as well as leading legislators, administrators and 
legal reform organizations that were conducted in Cordoba and Buenos Aires in August 2004 under 
the auspices of the Chase Educational Foundation. I am particularly indebted to Susan and Duncan 
Chase, Gonzalo Pereyra de Olazbal, and judges Jorge Alemany, and Guillermo Antelo. Among those 
interviewed were: Dr. Luis Enrique Pereira Duarte, President, Selection Commission and Judicial 
School, National Council of the Magistry (Presidente, Comisión Selección y Escuela Judicial, Consejo 
de la Magistratura Poder Judicial de la Nacion); Dr. Francisco M.D.J. Majen, Executive Secretary of 
the National Council of the Magistry (Secretario Letrado, Consejo de la Magistratura Poder Judicial de 
la Nacion); Mr. Héctor Chayer, General Director and Ms. Mariana Guisarri, Academic Coodinator of 
FORES (Foro de Estudios sobre la Administración de Justicia); and Alberto Gustavo Iannella 
(lawyer). 
 79. See CONST. ARG. arts. 99(4), 114 (amend. 1994). 
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Thus, Argentine judges share with their American counterparts an often 
partisan—especially Peronist—political past and a relatively extreme form 
of individual independence. However, like some other civil law systems, 
such as Italy, Spain, and France, oral trial proceedings are unusual. Judges 
rarely hear live witnesses or take testimony. Rather, decisions are usually 
based solely on documentary submissions. Acting alone without a jury, 
judges decide cases, determining the facts and the applicable legal rules 
often in chambers or even at home. They do not confer in any collegial 
fashion about cases, nor is there necessarily an adversarial hearing in the 
presence of attorneys from both sides. Because judges individually hire 
their own staff, no central court administration exists to ensure efficient 
overall management of cases. 
Moreover, the pool of attorneys qualified for appointment is huge. The 
University of Buenos Aires alone has nearly 30,000 law students who 
satisfy the requirements to become an attorney upon graduation. Although 
the judicial council has instituted a selection system with an examination 
as one component, apparently only one province (Cordoba) has followed 
suit. And, it appears, the level of competence for qualification remains 
quite low. Apparently, a plurality of judges in Argentina begin their 
careers as law students in low level clerical positions—often unpaid—in 
the courts, moving into staff positions when they graduate and then 
acquiring sufficient knowledge of the system to enable them to do 
reasonably well on whatever examination or proficiency test required to 
fill vacancies at the lowest level. Later, as a first instance judge with some 
experience, these former clerks have an advantage for appointment to 
chambers of higher level courts. The effect is a career “bureaucratic” 
judiciary without the safeguards against political involvement and 
competence, or internal monitoring controls to prevent corruption. 
CONCLUSION 
Most legal systems around the globe share one of four basic 
configurations for judicial selection and organization. The most common 
is the continental European pattern of career judges. Within this group, 
Japan stands out as being, on the one hand, one of the most politically 
autonomous judicial bureaucracies, and on the other, one of the most 
closely self-monitored. The United Kingdom is the model for the second 
most common configuration, one followed in nearly all commonwealth 
nations. In the English system, judges are selected from a small pool of 
elite barristers. Traditionally, judges themselves have a significant voice in 
the selection process, although formally, judges are politically appointed. 
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The U.S. variation is the most political of all selection processes. As in 
other common law systems, however, once appointed, judges in the United 
States enjoy the broadest scope of individual autonomy. The prevailing 
pattern in Latin America combines features from both the United States 
and continental European systems, not necessarily with success. Measured 
by the available means to ensure both competence and integrity, no 
configuration surpasses the Japanese system. To the extent that the pool of 
potential judges is limited by educational requirements and merit-based 
examinations, arguably other continental European systems, such as 
Germany’s, also fare well.80 Systems that allow monitoring of the behavior 
of individual judges also have an advantage in preventing corruption. Most 
civil law systems, for example, routinely evaluate the conduct of judges 
for promotion and assignment. The resulting capacity for prompt 
punishment is again a civil law advantage. Not surprisingly, countries with 
the lowest levels of corruption tend to be well-established civil law 
systems. But all things are not equal. 
As exemplified by Latin America, the continental European approach 
does not necessarily ensure competency. Systems that provide broad 
access to legal education and lack stringent merit-based examination 
systems have no means to generate competence. Nor, to the extent that 
individual judges are not monitored, are career judges necessarily less 
corruptible. As evidenced by England and Wales, a system in which 
judges enjoy elite status, resulting in “prestige capital,” provides informal 
incentives for the internalization of norms and for peer pressures that may 
operate effectively in tandem to foster both competence and honesty.  
Ultimately, we return to political values and context. Any attempt to 
reform judicial systems, either to limit access or monitor individual judges 
(or both), runs counter to deeply held values within common law systems, 
particularly the United States. American reforms are apt to reject reform 
proposals that limit political accountability. Such emphases, coupled with 
concern for a diverse judiciary that reflects the social and political 
composition of the community as a whole, make countervailing reforms 
difficult. As Linn Hammergren concludes with respect to legal reform in 
Latin America, judicial reform is political.81 The paths ultimately followed 
will be those determined by political actors and their prevailing values. 
Which political actors and whose values remains in doubt. 
 80. David S. Clark, The Selection and Accountability of Judges in West Germany: 
Implementation of a Rechtsstaat, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1795 (1988). 
 81. HAMMERGREN, FIFTEEN YEARS, supra note 27, at 12. 
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